Private Complements to Public Governance by Bremer, Emily S.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 81 
Issue 4 Fall 2016- Symposium Article 14 
Fall 2016 
Private Complements to Public Governance 
Emily S. Bremer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Emily S. Bremer, Private Complements to Public Governance, 81 MO. L. REV. (2016) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/14 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 Private Complements to Public Governance 
Emily S. Bremer* 
If Philip Hamburger’s arguments were to win the day, and the adminis-
trative state were abolished or significantly reduced in size and scope, what 
would replace it?1  If it were abolished completely, perhaps the simplest an-
swer could be given: only the classical institutions of government created by 
the U.S. Constitution – the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary – would 
remain.2  In the more likely event that the administrative state were reduced 
in size or scope, one or more alternative approaches might be needed to fill 
the resulting regulatory gaps.  Indeed, a principal justification for the admin-
istrative state is that the needs of modern regulation are beyond the capacity 
of the classical institutions of government.3  If so, then without administrative 
agencies, some other institution or approach would be needed to address 
modern regulatory problems. 
This Article suggests that private governance offers an attractive alterna-
tive or complement to the administrative state.  It is commonly assumed that 
without administrative agencies, there would be no regulation.  As a founda-
tional matter, this Article challenges the notion that there are only two, mutu-
ally exclusive options: governmental regulation or no regulation all.  Alt-
hough it is perfectly natural for public law scholars to focus primarily on reg-
ulation through government institutions and programs, much regulation is in 
fact accomplished via mechanisms outside the administrative state.4  At least 
in some circumstances, it is not only possible but may even be preferable to 
use such private governance – alone or in conjunction with public regulation 
– to achieve public goals. 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. 
 1. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).  I 
leave it to other contributors to this Symposium to directly address Philip Hamburg-
er’s arguments against the administrative state.  Leaving aside the first-order question 
of whether those arguments are persuasive, I focus exclusively on the possibility of 
workable alternatives to the modern administrative state. 
 2. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III. 
 3. See Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication 
Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2016) (“[Under a full-throated nondele-
gation doctrine,] Congress would be required to legislate on technical subjects on a 
magnitude too large for it to keep a modern economy and government functioning.”). 
 4. For example, social norms as a non-legal force regulating conduct have at-
tracted significant scholarly attention.  See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS (2002); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); cf. Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount 
Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 626 (2001) 
(“The number of articles using a rational choice framework to discuss the interaction 
of law and norms is now too large to list even in a law review footnote.”). 
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Before this possibility can be assessed, “private governance” must be 
defined.  As the term itself suggests, private governance has two components 
that are both self-evident and yet also warrant elaboration.  First, private gov-
ernance must be private, which most importantly means nongovernmental.5  
It thus includes any action by people, entities, or institutions that exist outside 
of government.  Second, private governance must be governance, defined 
broadly as actions in pursuit of traditionally governmental ends.6  These ends 
may include the protection of public values, the provision of public goods, 
and the regulation of social conduct in a manner that is beneficial for society 
as a whole. 
To make this abstract definition of “private governance” more concrete, 
Part I of this Article begins by offering a number of examples of how private 
governance presently complements the administrative state.  Part II suggests 
that the concept of comparative institutional advantage offers a touchstone for 
identifying situations in which private governance may be an effective and 
attractive alternative to governmental regulation.  Recognizing that private 
governance is not always the best option, however, Part II also suggests some 
limitations on its use. 
I.  A SPECTRUM OF PRIVATE ACTION TOWARD PUBLIC ENDS 
There are a variety of ways in which private governance can be used to 
achieve public ends, and the options can best be understood by organizing 
them along a spectrum.  At one end of the spectrum are regimes that use or 
leverage private governance mechanisms but are designed, created, driven, 
and controlled by government.  At the other end of the spectrum are regimes 
that are designed to achieve traditionally governmental ends but are inde-
pendently designed, created, driven, and controlled by private sector actors 
and institutions.  Frequently the focus of economic analysis, scholars describe 
these latter regimes as “private ordering” or “private governance.”7  Between 
the two extremes are regimes that mix elements of public and private govern-
ance, using each approach in some measure to achieve regulatory goals.  Over 
 
 5. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2029, 2031 (2005) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private Life]. 
 6. Cf. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 146 (2013) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private Environmental 
Governance] (defining “private environmental governance” as “actions taken by non-
governmental entities that are designed to achieve traditionally governmental ends”).  
Some scholars have used the term “private regulation” to mean essentially the same 
thing.  See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 291, 293 (2014) (using the term “private regulation” to refer to 
situations in which “private actors engage in developing and implementing rules that 
serve the traditional social goals of public regulation, particularly health, safety, and 
environmental protection”). 
 7. See generally Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1745 (1996) (discussing the law and economics literature on private ordering). 
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the last fifteen years, public law scholars have increasingly noted and exam-
ined these regimes, referring to them as “public-private hybrids.”8  Figure 1 













A.  Government-Dominated Approaches 
On the government side of the spectrum are programs through which 
government institutions (e.g., Congress or an administrative agency) establish 
substantive standards of conduct, leaving it to the private sector to implement 
or enforce those standards.9  One way this may be accomplished is through 
the creation of private rights of action to enforce federal statutes.10  For ex-
ample, in the employment discrimination context, federal statutes create anti-
discrimination rules, and these rules predominantly are enforced by private 
litigants bringing lawsuits against offending employers in the federal courts.11  
Government is paramount in this regime: Congress created the regime and the 
 
 8. Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2032; see also, e.g., Jody Free-
man, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546–49 (2000) 
(describing “the reality of public/private interdependence” in regulatory decisionmak-
ing).  Public-private hybrids are sometimes also referred to as “government-
stakeholder network structures.”  Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2032. 
 9. This skips over purely governmental regulation because the subject of this 
Article is how private governance either complements governmental regulation or 
offers an alternative to it.  Of course, even in “purely” government regulation, private 
parties have some role.  As Professor Vandenbergh explains, however, “[T]he story 
about private actors has remained essentially static: Firms attempt to influence regula-
tions, but once an agency promulgates a regulation, a private firm is assumed to either 
comply or not comply.”  Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2031. 
 10. See generally J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement 
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012) (arguing that pri-
vate regulation through litigation is an integral part of the modern administrative 
state’s structure). 
 11. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(k), 78 Stat. 
241, 261 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)) (providing attorney’s fees to 
prevailing private parties as an incentive to litigate employment discrimination 
claims); George Rutherglen, Private Rights and Private Actions: The Legacy of Civil 
Rights in the Enforcement of Title VII, 95 B.U. L. REV. 733, 734 (2015) (explaining 
that “a crucial feature of Title VII as civil rights legislation” is that it “gives control 
over enforcement of the statute to the individuals whose civil rights have been violat-
ed”); Glover, supra note 10, at 1148–1151 (offering labor and employment law as an 
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substantive standards that apply within it, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) plays an important role within the regime, and the 
federal courts control the incremental development of legal norms via indi-
vidual decisions that have precedential effect.  At the same time, individual 
private citizens must bring the lawsuits in order to animate the regime and 
make it effective.12 
B.  Public-Private Hybrids 
Moving toward the private ordering end of the spectrum, there are pub-
lic-private hybrids that involve a greater degree of independent private partic-
ipation in the achievement of public ends.13  A key example is the privatiza-
tion of traditionally public functions, which is often accomplished through 
government contracting.14  In these arrangements, public funds are used to 
pay a private entity to perform a public function that the government has his-
torically performed, such as providing health and welfare services, public 
education, or prisons.15  The government is a driving force in these relation-
ships, defining and paying for the work that is performed and retaining signif-
icant contractual control over both the public-private relationship and the 
contractors’ conduct.16 
In some cases, public-private hybrids may also participate in the devel-
opment of substantive regulatory standards and in the implementation and 
enforcement of those standards.  In these cases, there may be some contractu-
al relationship between an administrative agency and one or more private 
actors.17  But rather than providing public services to citizens, the resulting 
public-private hybrid engages in one or more of three tasks that are tradition-
ally the province of administrative agencies: “the setting, implementation, 
and enforcement (including monitoring) of standards.”18  This occurs through 
 
 12. There are many other examples of the integral role of private lawsuits in the 
U.S. regulatory system.  See Anna Chu, The Need to Protect Private Enforcement 
Mechanisms, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 7, 2014, 9:50 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/regulation/news/ 
2014/11/07/100757/the-need-to-protect-private-enforcement-mechanisms/. 
 13. See generally Symposium, Thirty-Third Annual Administrative Law Issue: 
Agencies, Economic Justice, and Private Initiatives, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003); Sym-
posium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1687 (2002). 
 14. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367, 1369 (2003); Michele E. Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized 
Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 571 (2001). 
 15. See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the 
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1237–42 (2003). 
 16. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 
389 (2003). 
 17. See Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2037. 
 18. Id. at 2038. 
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a variety of methods, including negotiated rulemaking,19 the incorporation by 
reference of privately developed standards into regulations,20 and the use of 
audited self-regulation or third-party conformity assessment to support gov-
ernmental regulatory regimes.21  Another example is second-order regulatory 
agreements, which are “agreements entered into between regulated firms and 
other private actors in the shadow of public regulations.”22  Private parties 
undertake these agreements independently and without governmental in-
volvement or direction.  But they typically do so in response to the presence 
or absence of regulation.23 
Although public-private hybrids involve more independent action by 
private entities to achieve public ends, the government retains primacy in the 
relationship.24  For example, Jody Freeman, a scholar who has worked exten-
sively in this area, has suggested “the possibility of harnessing private capaci-
ty to serve public goals.”25  Indeed, public law scholars often consider public-
private hybrids attractive because of their potential to improve government 
performance or solve perceived problems in public regulatory programs.26   
 19. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 
4969 (1990) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570). 
 20. See National Technology Transfer & Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-113, § 12(d), 110 Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3710a–3710d); Of-
fice of Management & Budget, Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, “Federal Par-
ticipation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in 
Conformity Assessment Activities,” 81 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 27, 2016); Emily S. 
Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 131, 139–41 (2013) [hereinafter Bremer, Incorporation by Reference].  
The private standardization system is discussed further below.  See infra Part I.C. 
 21. See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the use of third-party verification in regulation); 
Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory 
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 218–22 (1995) (discussing the use of private 
auditing in hospitals). 
 22. Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2030. 
 23. See generally Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5 (discussing the role of 
second-order agreements in regulation).  When these agreements are entered into in 
order to ensure compliance with existing regulations, they appear to be more like 
public-private hybrids.  When they are entered into to fill gaps where no public regu-
lations yet exist, they may fall further along the spectrum toward private ordering.  
See infra Part I.C. 
 24. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 146. 
 25. See Freeman, supra note 8, at 549; see also Nina A. Mendelson, Private 
Control over Access to Public Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Pri-
vate Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 747 (2014) (defining “collaborative govern-
ance” as “the public enlisting of private institutions and resources in the process of 
governance”); McAllister, supra note 6, at 295 (examining “whether and how private 
regulation can be leveraged – or harnessed – by public regulators to achieve the ob-
jectives of public law” and address deficiencies of governmental regulation). 
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Government ordinarily is the driving force in these arrangements, the focus of 
which is the implementation of regulatory standards or objectives established 
by government institutions. 
C.  Private Ordering 
Moving still further in the direction of private ordering are alternatives 
in which the primary public connection is to the ends or goals of a regime that 
is predominantly controlled and driven by private institutions or actors.  A 
good recent example is found in Michael Vandenbergh’s work on private 
environmental governance.27  Private environmental governance includes 
actions voluntarily and independently undertaken by private sector actors to 
achieve traditionally public ends in spaces where no governmental regulation 
presently exists.  These activities include collective environmental standard 
setting, as well as purely private contracts that facilitate bilateral environmen-
tal standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement.28  One example is found in 
the 465 ecolabelling programs that now exist around the world.29  In these 
programs, nongovernmental organizations establish environmental standards 
and award the privilege of using a particular label on products or services that 
are certified compliant.  Generally, no public law or governmental regulator 
requires compliance with the standards, participation in the certification pro-
cess, or display of the label.  Private certification systems operate much the 
same and serve similar functions.30  Another example is the Leadership in 
Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) standards, which are estab-
lished by the U.S. Green Building Council.31  These “standards allow builders 
to certify compliance with efficiency and environmental requirements at sev-
eral levels of stringency (Platinum, Gold, Silver, and Bronze).”32 
Moving beyond the environmental context, the U.S. technical standardi-
zation system is a vast, predominately private, independent governance struc-
ture that has both a long history and a significant role in the achievement of 
traditionally public goals.33  Technical standards are essential for technologi-
cal innovation and interoperability, trade, the economy, and public health and 
 
 27. See generally Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 
6. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., ECOLABEL INDEX, www.ecolabelindex.com (last visited Oct. 25, 
2016) (tracking 465 ecolabels in 199 countries and twenty-five industry sectors). 
 30. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 149–
151 (discussing certification systems for forestry sustainability, fishery sustainability, 
and aquaculture). 
 31. See LEED, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/leed (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2016). 
 32. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 153. 
 33. See generally Emily S. Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public 
Law, 63 KAN. L. REV. 279, 299–306 (2015) [hereinafter Bremer, On the Cost] (ex-
plaining the history and operation of the U.S. standards system). 
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safety.  Although these standards are a ubiquitous part of life, they are largely 
invisible to the average consumer.  The system through which these standards 
are created emerged in the late 1800s and early 1900s, when a number of 
private organizations emerged to fulfill the enormous standardization needs 
of, first, the industrial revolution and, second, the World Wars.34  Today, this 
system remains predominately private.  But it has grown in size, importance, 
and sophistication, with a large number of organizations using voluntary con-
sensus procedures to create the standards and then maintain them as technol-
ogy and other circumstances rapidly change and evolve.35 
The U.S. standards system has largely escaped the notice of public law 
scholars – perhaps because it is predominantly private – but its sheer size and 
central importance to significant, traditionally public ends make it well worth 
study.36  It is estimated that there are over 100,000 private technical standards 
in use throughout the country, created by more than 600 active standards de-
velopment organizations.  To give a rough comparison with public regulation, 
there are over 100 agencies in the federal government, and not all of these 
exercise regulatory power.  Although federal agencies commonly incorporate 
private standards into federal regulations, it is estimated that only 2 to 4 per-
cent of all private standards are ever so incorporated.37  As these numbers 
suggest, the U.S. standards system is an enormous private governance regime 
that has relatively minimal interface with governmental regulatory programs.  
And yet it has for a long period succeeded in efficiently and effectively ac-
complishing a wide range of public goals.38 
One way in which these various private governance regimes differ from 
public-private hybrids is that they generally arise in the absence of govern-
 
 34. Id. at 301, 305, 310. 
 35. See generally ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for 





 36. There has been a recent burst of scholarly interest in the incorporation by 
reference of private technical standards because the copyrights that standards devel-
opment organizations ordinarily assert in the standards they produce have emerged as 
a barrier to making incorporated standards as freely available to the public as regula-
tions and other agency documents have become in the Internet age.  See Bremer, On 
the Cost, supra note 33; Mendelson, supra note 25; Peter L. Strauss, Private Stand-
ards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497 (2013); 
Bremer, Incorporation by Reference, supra note 20; see also Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States, Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 
Fed. Reg. 2257, 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012) (recommending a collaborative, non-legislative 
solution to the problem of public access to materials incorporated by reference in 
federal regulation). 
 37. See Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 33, at 306–07 
 38. See Bremer, Incorporation by Reference, supra note 20, at 139–41. 
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mental direction or regulation.39  In some cases, private governance fills a gap 
in governmental regulation.40  For example, as Professor Vandenbergh notes, 
Congress has failed to enact any major environmental legislation since the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and so private actors have worked to fill 
the gap by addressing new environmental problems and generating needed 
environmental norms.41  The private standards system similarly emerged be-
cause of the failure of states and the federal government to meet widespread 
standardization needs.42  In other cases, private actors may regulate them-
selves in an effort to forestall or preempt governmental regulation.43 
The absence of public regulation distinguishes private governance from 
public-private hybrids in another important respect: it provides greater lati-
tude for independent private action with little or no governmental involve-
ment.  Private control in these areas is more comprehensive, beginning with 
the development of substantive norms and continuing through the implemen-
tation and enforcement of those norms.  The resulting regulatory system, alt-
hough private, may be large, complex, sophisticated, and highly effective.  In 
some instances, so much so that public regulatory authorities may discover 
that it is necessary to integrate existing private governance regimes into pub-
lic regulation in order to best protect public values, promote health and safe-
ty, or fulfill other statutory mandates.44  In short, the primacy of government, 
which is observable at previous points along the spectrum, is generally absent 
in those areas in which private governance has emerged fully. 
II.  CHOOSING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 
If private governance can be considered as an alternative or complement 
to the administrative state, what metric should be used to identify areas in 
which the goals of existing public regulation might be addressed effectively 
through private governance?  Perhaps an appropriate metric is that of com-
parative institutional advantage, a concept often invoked in the separation of 
powers context.45  Private actors or institutions may have characteristics that 
 
 39. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 293. 
 40. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond 
the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the 
Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2011) (discussing 
the role of private actors in transnational governance); John McMillan & Christopher 
Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 
(2000) (describing how private ordering of commercial transactions arises in develop-
ing economies that are believed to have unreliable formal legal systems). 
 41. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 131–133. 
 42. See Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 33, at 303–04. 
 43. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 294. 
 44. See Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 33, at 308–09. 
 45. See, e.g., William H. Clune, Courts and Legislatures as Arbitrators of Social 
Change, 93 YALE L.J. 763, 763 (1984) (“The theory 
of comparative institutional advantage allocates substantive decisionmaking between 
8
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enable them to address certain kinds of regulatory problems more efficiently 
or effectively than administrative agencies.46  In such instances, those private 
actors or institutions may be said to have some comparative institutional ad-
vantage over public institutions such as federal regulatory agencies. 
Private institutions may have several advantages over government agen-
cies.  First, in some cases, addressing a regulatory problem may require spe-
cialized experience or knowledge that exists outside of government.  For ex-
ample, developing technical standards ordinarily requires cutting-edge engi-
neering or technological knowledge and experience.47  It is not primarily a 
matter of making policy choices or creating rules to manage human conduct 
or relations.  Reflecting this reality, the people who volunteer their time to 
participate in technical standards development are typically engineers or other 
technical experts who work in the industry that will use and be affected by 
the standards.48  Second, private institutions may be able to respond more 
nimbly, efficiently, and cost-effectively than administrative agencies to 
changes in technology, industry practice, or other circumstances.49  This is 
partially because public law requirements, such as the procedural require-
ments for notice-and-comment rulemaking, do not constrain private institu-
tions as they do administrative agencies.50  Private governance is often volun-
tary, accomplished by agreement and in accord with self-interest.  Under 
these conditions, it may be easier to take action.  And that action may be ac-
corded greater respect and adherence over time. 
Just as private governance may have advantages, it may also have limi-
tations.  As noted, private governance is often effective and efficient precisely 
because it is voluntary.  But this suggests the possibility that private govern-
ance is unlikely to work well to address matters that are highly controversial 
or significantly contested.  If affected parties have strongly divergent inter-
 
courts and legislatures according to their relative ability to make truly representative 
decisions.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 
139 (“[G]overnment may not always be the best actor, and public regulation may not 
always be the best type of intervention.  The optimal response may be private govern-
ance or a mix of public and private governance.”). 
 47. See generally ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN 
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS (1990) (examining pairs of public and private 
standards to evaluate the comparative institutional advantages of private standards 
development organizations and federal regulatory agencies); cf. Timothy D. Lytton, 
Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Con-
straints That Frustrate Government Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 539, 
539 (2014) (identifying “key features of reliable private certification and analyz[ing] 
its comparative institutional advantages over government regulation”). 
 48. See Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 33, at 308. 
 49. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 138. 
 50. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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ests, they may not be able to come to an agreement.51  In such circumstances, 
the coercive authority of the state may be needed both to decide upon a 
course of action and to implement or enforce the chosen solution.52  It may be 
more appropriate in these situations for public institutions to govern. 
In addition to such practical considerations, private governance may 
raise normative and procedural concerns.53  When a regime is intended to 
achieve public ends or protect public values, it may also be important for that 
regime to adhere to rules and norms that reflect public values.54  For example, 
a private governance system should be transparent, so that both its partici-
pants and products are knowable to a public that may be affected by that sys-
tem.  Rules to ensure openness and participation by a balanced range of af-
fected interests may similarly be necessary to preserve legitimacy and protect 
the substantive validity of a private governance regime.55  Experience shows 
that government can influence private entities, both directly through regula-
tion and indirectly through relationships and networks, to adopt these and 
other socially beneficial rules and policies.56 
III.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has suggested that the possibilities for private governance 
are as numerous and diverse as are the challenges the modern administrative 
state is designed to address.  These possibilities could prove useful in the 
event that, as Philip Hamburger has urged, the administrative state were to be 
abolished or significantly reduced in scope.  But private governance is also 
worth considering – either alone or in conjunction with public regulation – in 
the absence of such extraordinary circumstances.  By considering the com-
parative institutional advantages of public and private actors and carefully 
evaluating the public norms that may be at stake in a particular regulatory 
 
 51. See CHEIT, supra note 47, at 39–64 (discussing the private sector’s inability 
to develop an effective standard to prevent the risks of combustible dust due to deep 
disagreement over fundamentally non-technical issues). 
 52. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 143. 
 53. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Private Order and Public Institutions, Comments on 
McMillan and Woodruff’s ‘Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order’, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2481, 2481–82 (2000) (arguing that private ordering must be accom-
panied by public order in order to achieve “greater legitimacy and fairness”). 
 54. The application of public norms to private actors is referred to as “publiciza-
tion.”  See Avishai Benish & Asa Maron, Infusing Public Law into Privatized Wel-
fare: Lawyers, Economists and the Competing Logics of Administrative Reform, 50 L. 
& SOC’Y REV. 953, 956 (2016). 
 55. See, e.g., Office of Management & Budget, Revision of OMB Circular No. 
A-119, “Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus 
Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities,” 81 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 27, 
2016) (identifying basic procedural expectations for the development of voluntary 
consensus technical standards). 
 56. See Freeman, supra note 8, at 671–73. 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/14
2016] PRIVATE COMPLEMENTS 1125 
context, the most effective mixture of public and private governance can be 
selected.  Public law scholars have recognized the potential, and there is sig-
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